Monetary Policy Without Quantity Variables by Benjamin M. Friedman
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES 
MONETARY POLICY WITHOUT QUANITY VARIABLES 
Benjamin M. Friedman 
Working Paper No. 2552 
NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH 
1050 Massachusetts Avenue 
Cambridge, MA  02138 
April 1988 
I  am grateful to Kenneth Kuttner and James Stock for helpful discussions, and 
to the Harvard Program for Financial Research and the National Science Foundation 
for research support.  The research reported here is part of  the NBERs research 
program in Financial Markets and Monetary Economics.  Any opinions expressed are 
those of the author and not those of the National Bureau of  Economic Research. 
Support from The Lynde and Harry Bradley Foundation is gratefully acknowledged. NBER  Working  Paper  #2552 
April 1988 
Monetary  Policy Without quantity Variables 
ABSTRACT 
The collapse  in  the 1980s of  familiar relationships connecting money to 
either income or  prices has thrown into question long-standing presumptions 
about the appropriate conduct of  monetary policy.  Once data  from  the 1980s are 
included, tests of  several kinds  --  including simple regression  tests, vector 
autoregressions  tests, and tests for cointegration  -- all fail to show evidence 
of  properties  that would support using money as the central fulcrum of  monetary 
policy.  The Federal Reserve System, whether in  response to these developments 
or  for independent reasons, appears to have refocused monetary policy  onto 
movements of  short-term interest rates.  The experience of the i950s  and 1960s 
suggests that this alternative approach also  suffers from potentially  serious 
drawbacks, which  little recent research has addressed. 
Benjamin M. Friedman 
Harvard University 
Littauer Center 127 
Cambridge, MA  02138 The  collapse of  the money-income relationship in  the l9BOs has thrown into 
question long-standing presumptions about the appropriate  conduct of  monetary 
policy.  Before the l980s economists and policymakers had long debated the role 
that aggregate measures of  money  (or credit) should play  in  the monetary policy 
process.  Although  issues of a  non-empirical nature were also important in this 
regard  -- for example, the desire for a system under  which policymakers could be 
readily monitored and held  accountable  -  -  the  central issue was always the 
stability and  reliability  of the money-income relationship.  Those who believed 
that  it was highly  stable typically sought to  tie monetary policy  more  rigidly to 
fixed money  growth targets, while those who doubted this stability sought to  base 
monetary  policy  not just on  money but on  other variables too (credit, for 
example),  and in  any case to  make  the connection between policy  actions and 
either money  or any  other specific variables more flexible. 
What  was at issue throughout this period, however, was mostly the short-run 
conduct of monetary policy, and therefore the short-run stability of  the money- 
Income relationship:  fluctuations from quarter to  quarter, or  perhaps even year 
to year.  Few economists or policymakers expressed doubts that  the money-income 
relationship was highly stable over a time horizon as  long as  the average 
business cycle, and therefore few  argued that money growth  qhould not follow a 
narrowly  specified trend over several years taken together.  For those who were 
skeptical that a more  activist policy could successfully carry out 
countercyclical  stabilization anyway, the widely  agreed  upon  stability of the 
money-income relationship over  longer horizons led naturally  to a fixed money 
growth  policy  even in  the shorn tuna. 
The events o  the lffOs have  been  so  important for thinking about monetary 
policy  precisely  because they have contradicted this more  fundamental confidence 
In  the stability of  the money-income relationship in the longer run.  For  the 2 
five  years ending at mid 1987, the average growth rate of  the Ni money  stock was 
108%  per annum -- far above that for any  sustained period  in  recent U.S. 
experience.  Yet inflation has been modest  by  historical  standards, and real 
income growth for this period  as a  whole has hardly been  extraordinary compared 
to previous U.S. business cycle expansions.  It is difficult to  escape the 
conclusion that, not just for a year or a calendar quarter but over an  entire 
half-decade, money growth has simply been  irrelevant to  any outcome that  marters 
for monetary policy. 
Analogous relationships between income or  prices and  other financial 
quantity variables have  fared little or no  better during this period.  Broader 
measures of  monay, or  the monetary base, or  measures of  credit have  all 
fluctuated in patterns bearing little visible connection to any plausible 
objective of  monetary policy.  As a  result, the entire role of  such quantity 
variables  in  the monetary policy process -- either  money or  any of  the others  -- 
is now practically devoid of  empirical support based on  recent experience.  At 
the aame time, however, no one  has satisfactorily outlined an  alternative 
monetary policy framawork that does not rely  on such variables.  Tht weault  is a 
vacuum at  the canter of  the monetary molcy  process. 
I.  Money  and Income. Nonay  and Prices 
One picture and  one example from the recant literature are sufficient  to 
place in  perspective the collapse of  the relationship between money  and either 
income or  prices in  the l980s. 
First, the picture:  Figure 1 plots the ratio of  the Ml money  stock ro 
nominal GNP for each quarter from  1959:1 (when the redefined Ml series begins) tc 
1987:111.  Through 1980:1V the money-income ratio followed the familiar 3% per 
annum  downward trend that practical discussions of  monetary policy  had come  to 









































































































trend of  only .0044 compared to  a l980:Iv value of  1466.  Since 1980 the short- 
run fluctuations have been visibly wider,  More importantly, the downward trend 
has not just disappeared but reversed course.  A aimple extrapolation of  the 
1959-80 trend implies a money-income ratio of  0991 by 1987:111,  The actual 
value wee .1662, greater by  more  than 15 standard deviations, 
The analogous relationship for credit, the outotandng indebtedness of  all 
domaatc non-financial  borrowers, has fallen apart just as  badly.  During 1959-80 
the credit-income ratio exhibited a standard deviation of only  0187 (around a 
neglIgible end statistically  insignIficant trend) competed to a  l980:iv value of 
13782.  By 1987:11  the  gap between the actual ratio and the trend extrapc]ation 
-was  more than 23  standard deviations, 
Second.  the example:  In  chase same pere  and_Frocea4jgs  four  years ego, 
Milton Friedman (1984) argued  that neither the money-income nor the money-p-rice 
relationship had  broken  dcwn after October 1979, when the Federal Reserve experi- 
ranted  with  a  policy  centered on  money growth targets.  He instead argued  that 
both  relationships bed continued to  hold  up If  interpreted correctly.  For the 
money-income relatIonship, Friedman emphasized abort-run comovemence,  focuein5 on 
each quarter's imcome growth and  money growth in  the prior quarter.  For the 
money--price  relatIonship, he  emphasized longer-run comovements  focusing on 
average inflation over  successive  two-year intervals end average money  growth 
over the prior two years. 
SInce Friedman wrote, however, both  of  the relationships on  which he  based 
his arguments keys  even  changed sign.  The correlation between the respective 
growth rates of  nominal income and  Ml legged one quarter was .45 during the 
1979:IV-l983:Iv  sample he  used,  The same correlation computed for 1984:1-1987:11 
IS Rjfls  .10.  Friedman dd  not report a correlation for the biennial growth 
rates of  prices and lagged money  but simply showed the data for each  successive 4 
biennium, beginning with  1973:111-1975:111 for the GNP deflator and 1971:111- 
1973:111 for Ml.  The direction of  the change in Ml growth  in  each of  these 
periods had foretold the direction of  the change  in inflation in the next, and  on 
this basis Friedman predicted,  "The increased rate of money  growth in  the 1981- 
83 biennium  suggests that we have  passed the trough in  inflation and that 
inflation will  be  decidedly higher  from 1983 to 1985 than it was from  1981-83." 
Instead, inflation turned out to be  lower during  1983:111-1985:111 than  during 
1981:111-1983:111, and it  was lower still during 1985:111-1987:111  despite 
continued high  money growth during 1983:111-1985:111.  The correlation  computed 
over  the five  observations Friedman exhibited was .70.  Computed over those five 
observations and  the two more that are now  available,  the correlation  is minus 
.23, 
II.  Money and Credit as  Information Variables 
The breakdown of such  simple money-income or  money-price  relationships casts 
doubt on  the use of money  (or credit) as a target of monetary  policy  in  any 
rigid, mechanical  sense.  It  need not preclude a useful role  for such variables 
in the monetary policy process, however, as long as their movements  provide 
information about subsequent fluctuations of  income or  prices, or  any other 
outcomes that monetary policy seeks to affect.1  A  policy  framework based on 
aggregate measures of  money  (or credit) used  as "information variables"  is more 
flexible, and hence more  complicated  and harder  to monitor externally,  than a 
framework based on such variables used  as policy targets.  The greater the extent 
to which the relationships  that connect these variables  to  income and prices are 
affected both  by  other variables  (like interest rates) and  by stochastic shocks, 
however, the greater are the relative merits of an  information  variable approach 
compared to a simpler targeting approach. 5 
aenae.  Kuttner  and 1 <1987) have shown  that evfdenca  of a variety  of forma, 
connecting money (or credit) to income and pricea, haa progreasively  deteriorated 
since 1979. 
Table 1 shows K2 statistics for the eatimation of "St. Louis" equations 
relating  the quarterly  growth  rate  of nominal  income to lagged growth  rates of 
several  respective  financial  quantity  variables  and  the  lagged  growth  rate  of 
high-employment  federal  spending,  over three  sample  periods.2  For 1960:11- 
1979:111 -- that is, until the introduction of  the new  monetary policy  procedures 
-- these  equations all exhibc the familiar modest  success  in accounting  for 
quarterly income growth, with  P2  values rsnging from  s low of .23 for the 
monetary base  to high  of .32  for Ml.  Extending the senple to  include data 
through yearend 1986 sharply lowers the P4 in each  case, however,  Dropping the 
observetfons  from the  l960s  eliminstes  it almost  altogether.  Not one of these 
equations for the more  recent period exhibits K2 even  as high  as .10. 
Table 2 shows Fstetistics  for tests of the null  hypothesis  that all of  the 
coefficients  on legged Ml growth  are  zero in equations  from  several series of 
vector  autoregressions.3  As  in Table I, results  are  shown  for  esch of three 
sample  periods:  from  the beginning of the 361  series  until  the fntroducton  of 
new  monetary policy procedures,  then through the most recent  data aveileble as of 
the time  of  writing, and then for the most recent data  without the 1960s. 
In  the context of the information variable  approsch to  monetary  policy, the 
much  debated issue of  whether stetistical experiments  like these constitute valid 
tests  of "causelity"  is beside  the point.  What  matters  is simply  whether  the 
movements of  some financial quantity convey information about future movements of 
income or  prices that  is not already conteined in  observed movements of income or 
prices  themselves.  If so, then monetery policy  can exploit that information by 
systematically  reacting  to observed movements  of these  variables,  regardless  of Table 1 
Coefficient  of Determination for Nominal Income Equations 
1960:11-1979:111  1960:11-1986  :IV  1970:111-1986  :IV 
Monetary Base  .23 
Ml  .32  .11  02 
M2  .27  .19  .06 
M3  .27  .16  .09 
Credit  .28  .10  - .02 Table 2 
F-Statistics  for Information  Value of Money (Ml) 
1960:11-1979:111  1960:11-1987:11  1970:1-1987:11 
Fiscal  Variable 
Included 
V  616a  263b  142 
K  1.98  1.91  1.33 
P  3•62b  .68  .47 
Fiscal  Variable 
Included 
599a  2,83b  1.92 
X  2.17c  2.21c  1.91 
P  365b  .75  .88 
a.  V  — nominal GNP  significant  at .01 level 
X  real GNP  bsignificant at .05 level 
P — C-NP  price deflator  Csignificant at .10 level 6 
prices  themselves.  If so,  then monetsry policy csn exploit that information by 
systematically reacting to observed movements of these variables,  regardless of 
whether this information reflects true causation, reverse causation based on 
anticipations,  or  mutual causation by some independent buc  unobserved  force. 
As of 1979, the available evidence strongly supported the view  that observed 
fluctuations of Ml in the United States did contain such information about future 
movements of  U.S. income and prices.  By  contrast,  the same experiments  carried 
out with  data for the mosc  recent  18 years provide no  supporc for the view  that 
fluctuations  in Ml carry information about future income and prices  that is not 
already containod in fluctuations of income and prices themselves.  Not one of 
the F-statistIcs for this more recent  sample is significant  at even  the .10 
level.  Once again, what is true for Ml  is also true for other money  and credIt 
aggregates.  The F-statistics for analogous experiments carried out with  142 or 
credit in  place of Ml show the same pattarm of changing significance as in 
Table 2.  Not one of  the F-statistics for M2, and not one for credit, is 
significant at the .10  level for the 1970:1-1987:11 sample. 
Not surprisingly, such findings have  prompted a search for  ways  to 'fix up" 
this form  of teat of the money-income relationship, just as a much  more intensive 
search, which began even earlier, has sought to  fix up  the money demand function. 
Stock and Parson  (1987), for example, showed that with  the right specification 
lagged Ml was in  fact significant  in equations for real income (proxied by 
industrial production) in  tests based on  monthly data for 1960:2-1985:12.  For a 
system including money,  income, prices and am  interest rate, together with a time 
trend, they  reported an  F-statistic of  3.04 (easily significant at  the  .01 level) 
for the null  hypothesis that  all of  the lagged money coeffIcients ware rero.  As 
Kuttner and I have  show-n, however, merely  extending the sample for this 
experiment  through 1987:9 reduces the F-statistic to  1.80, just barely 7 
significant at  the  .10 level (p value  .0994), and changes Stock and Watson's 
results for the other systems that they  investigated as  well. 
Table 3 shows that the most  recent experience has also eliminated 
statistical  support for the hypothesis that income and money (or credit) are 
cointegrated.  The table shows Dickey-Fuller t-statistics for the null hypothesis 
of no  cointegration between nominal income and each of several financial quantity 
variables,  in  the presence of a possibly nonlinear time trend.4  The results 
shown are based on  quarterly data  for three samples, which  here  differ only in 
their respective  end-points:  before the introduction of  new monetary policy 
procedures, before the abandonment of  those procedures,  and the latest data 
available as of  the time of  writing.  At  least for M2  and credit, the data 
through 1979:Ifl warranted  rejecting the null hypothesis  of  no cointagration with 
nomna1  income at  the  .05  level,  The data through 1982:11 did so  as well, albetr 
only at  the .10 level.  For data through 1987:11, however,  there is no  evidence 
of  cointagration with  nominal income for any of  these financial quantity 
variables 
III. Questions About Monetary Policy Since 1982 
If it  is difficult to  escape the conclusion that  financial quantity 
variables have  lost their relevance for monetary  policy  in  the 1980s, it is also 
difficult to escape  the conclusion that the Federal Reserve System has responded 
to this development by  conducting monetary policy  primarily with  reference to 
short-term nominal interest rates (and, indirectly, dollar  exchange rates).  One 
reason for drawing this conclusion is simply the return  to  interest rate 
stability after the Federal Reserve "suspended"  its Ml target in 1982.  The 
standard deviation of  the month-to-month change in  the three-month U.S. Treasury 
bill rate rose  from  .42% during 1970:1-1979:9 to 1.54% during 1979:10-1982:9, and 
than fall to .32% during 1982:10-1987:9.  Another reason is that what movements Table 3 
Dickey-Fuller  T-Statistics  for Cointegration  Tests 
1959:1-1979:111  1959:1-1982:11  1959:1-1987:111 
Monetary Base  -29O  -3O3  Q775 
Ml  -l 53a  1•61a  034a 
M2  367b  340ab  269a 
Credit  360b  328c  009a 
aaugrnented Dickey-Fuller t-statistic 
bsigniflcant at O5  level 
Csigriflcant at  10  level 8 
in  short-term  interest rates have  occurred since mid-1982 have  shown  little 
apparent connection  to fluctuations of  the major  monetary aggregates  (or credit) 
or to deviations  of  these aggregates  from the corresponding  official target 
ranges. 
The success of  U.S. monetary policy  in  macroeconomic  terms during these 
years notwithstanding,  a return to  approximately the same  monetary  framework that 
the Federal Reserve employed  a quarter-century  ago should give  cause for sone 
concern -- not  least because of  the systematic errors that  the Federal Resarve 
made  under that  policy.  The extensive analysis of  U.S. monetary  policy during 
the first two decades or so following the Treasury-Federal  Reserve Accord, 
including research carried out at  the time as well  as  subsequently, has 
documented three problems in  particular.  Each  bears renewed consideration  now 
that the Federal Reserve has returned to  what  amounts to  a policy  framework 
centered on  controlling nominal interest rates. 
First, and  most  obviously, this framework had  no  nominal quantity to  anchor 
the price level.  Although inflation was not therefore  inevitable, there was 
little protection  against it when  inflationary pressures  intensified in  the late 
l960s and especially  in the l970s.  For some years following Sargent ar.d 
Wallace's  (1975) demonstration that basing monetary policy on  nominal interest 
rates left  the price level indeterminate in  a  model  with "rational" expectations 
and perfectly  flexible prices, many  economists eschewed analysis of such  a policy 
framework altogether, and  concentrated only  on  policies based  on  controlling 
money.  As McCallum  (1981) has shown, however, even  in  Sargent and Wallace's 
model price  indeterminacy results only  when  the central bank  takes no  account of 
prices  (or any other nominal variable) in  choosing the level at  which to  set 
interest rates.6  Especially  in a context that allows for rigidities  in  price 
setting behavior  as well  as more  realistic representations  of  expectations, no 9 
one knows to  what extent it is practicslly possible to  avoid inflation with  a 
monetary policy framework based on  nominal interest rates, or how best to 
structure  such a policy  to  achieve that end. 
Second, once inflation did emerge. Federal Reserve officials  (and nany  other 
people too) often failed to  distinguish nominal from  real interest rates.  As a 
result, they often associated higher  observed interest rates with  a tighter 
policy  stance even  when the increase in  nomInal interest rates nerely kept pace 
with, or  even fell  short of, rising  inflation expectations.  In  light of  the 
enormous attention subsequently devoted to the distInctIon between nominal and 
real interest rates, both n  the research literature and at the popular level, i.t 
would  be surprising  ,.o  see thIs mistake repeated in such  an obvious way. 
Nevertheless,  inferring "the reel  Interest rate"  is hardly  straightforward. 
Expectations  of  futore  Inflation are unobservable,  end different people nay  hold 
dIfferent expectatIons anyway.  Different people and different  institutions also 
face different tax rates. 
Third,  there is also  substantial  evidence that, when  U.S. monetary polIcy 
relied  primarily or noninal  interest rates in  the past, Federal Reserve officIals 
systenatically  confused the level of Interest rates as the operating  instrument 
7 
of  policy with  the level of interest rates as an  ultimate obertiva of policy. 
As a result, they  usually  delayed too long before  raising or lowering interest 
rate  levels, and even  then  made changes of insufficient nsgnltude.  Although  this 
error too baa received  enormous attention, nore In the research  literature  than 
in  popular discussions, no one knows whether it ia now  possible  to design a 
nonetary  policy framework based  prinarily on interact ratea that can provide 
adequate safeguards against repeating  ft.  Still less has anyone  laid out In  any 
datail what  such  safeguards might be. 10 
The evidence  from recent experience is clear on  the potential role  of 
financial quantity  variables  in  the monetary policy  process,  and it is not 
positive.  Perhaps the time has come for  economists  to turn  at  least some of  the 
effort they  are  now spending on  trying to overturn  the evidence on  these 
variables  toward thinking about how best to  conduct nonetary  policy without them. 11 
Footnotes 
1.  See, for example, Kareken at al.  (1973) and  Friedman (1975,  1983). 
2.  These equations differ from the St.  Louis specification only by  omitting the 
contemporaneous value of each independent variable. 
3.  Each autoregression incluOes four lags on  each variable in the system, plus a 
constant.  All variables are in Log differences. 
4.  The cointegrating equation is in each case ln(f)  ln(a+b*t) + c*ln(yt)  + 
where  f is the financial quantity, y is nominal income  and e is a disturbance 
term.  The  null hypothesis of no  cointegration means that e is nonstationary. 
The values sho'  are augmented Dickey-Fuller t-statistics in  cases in  which 
higher  order autocovariance of  e is present, and ordinary Dickey-Fuller t- 
statistics  otherwise 
5.  Tests carried out in the forms ln(f)  a + b*ln(y) 
+ e and  — 
a  + b*t  + e also show no  evidence of cointegration for any of  these financial 
quantity variables in the data through 198711. 
6.  What Mctallum actually showed  was that taking account of  setting the 
interest rate resolves the price indeterminacy.  His result readily generalizes 
to the inclusion of  any nominal variable, however. 
7.  See, for  example, Brunner and  Meltzer (1964). 12 
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